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Abstract This article consists of an analysis of ethnographic material on Afghan 
trading networks involved in both the export of commodities from China to a variety 
of settings across Eurasia and the movement of ‘refugees’ from Afghanistan to Europe. 
Much recent work on trading networks has deployed the concept of trust to understand 
the functioning of such social formations. By contrast, in this article I assess the dura-
bility of Afghan networks in three ways. First, recognition of how they are polycentric 
and multi-nodal. Second, how they are successful in transforming their collective aims 
and projects in changing shifting political and economic circumstances. Third, how 
they are made up of individuals able to switch their statuses and activities within trad-
ing networks over time. Furthermore, I argue that a focus on the precise ways in which 
traders entrust capital, people and commodities to one another, reveals the extent to 
which social and commercial relationships inside trading networks are frequently 
impermanent and pregnant with concerns about mistrust and contingency. Recognit-
ion of this suggests that scholars should focus on practices of entrustment rather than 
abstract notions of trust in their analyses of trading networks per se, as well as seek 
to understand the ways in which these practices enable actors to handle and address 
questions of contingency. 
Keywords afghanistan, eurasia, merchants, refugees, trading networks, 
trust and entrustment 
 
The European Union’s so-called ‘refugee crisis’ in 2015/16 formed an important back-
drop to the eight months I spent conducting fieldwork between 2016 and 2018 with 
Afghan traders operating in the Chinese international trading city of Yiwu, located two 
hours by train from Shanghai. Afghan traders based in Yiwu regularly distinguished 
themselves from their compatriots (watandar) who had left Afghanistan or the countries 
in which they lived in Asia (usually Iran or Pakistan) to apply for asylum in the EU. By 
contrast, as there is no provision for refugee status in China, those living in the country 
cannot apply for asylum there.1 In fact, Yiwu’s Afghans have no hope of acquiring 
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Chinese citizenship: neither a long period of legal residence in the country nor marriage 
to a Chinese citizen qualifies China-based foreigners for Chinese citizenship. Against 
this backdrop, Afghans in China refer to themselves as traders (taajirha) and contrast 
their lives with those of their compatriots who have sought asylum in Western Europe 
and North America. Afghans in China must work hard for a living, I was often told, 
rather than sit at home, eating ‘free money’ (paisa-e muft) handed to them from the 
social security systems (sociaal) of the Western countries in which they were based. 
Afghans in China often emphasize that their mode of making a living is highly pre-
carious. Yet, they also regularly remark that leading such a life is positive because they 
do not have to endure the social stigma of being an officially designated refugee (Ingvars 
and Gíslason 2018). A handful of Yiwu-based Afghans have left China, returned to 
Afghanistan and travelled by way of Iran and Turkey to seek asylum in Europe. Traders 
in Yiwu tend to talk about those of their compatriots who have sought asylum in Europe 
in this manner with incredulity. One man in his mid-twenties from a wealthy family that 
owns several businesses in Yiwu, as well as a wholesale shop in Kabul, for example, left 
his job in the family business in Yiwu to travel from Kabul to Turkey. He paid a ‘smug-
gler’ to arrange his passage over a dangerous route across the Iran–Turkey border, but 
after entering Turkish territory, the vehicle in which he was travelling was involved in a 
serious accident. Hearing about the incident and being unable to reach the young man by 
telephone, his elder brother, who divides his time between Yiwu and Kabul, immediately 
flew to Istanbul: he was able to locate his badly injured brother, and offer him care and 
support until the Turkish authorities deported him to Afghanistan. Traders in both Yiwu 
and Kabul commented that the young man had led a good life in China: his brothers 
had given him a share of the family business; he lived in a flat for which his brothers 
paid the rent; and he performed a relatively straightforward job. Yet, they unanimously 
remarked, he was not happy in either Yiwu or Kabul: it was therefore his temperament 
(taabiyat) to be dissatisfied with his daily life, regardless of where it might be.  
Yiwu is connected to the world by multiple trading networks, which are often 
established on the basis of national and ethno-linguistic identity; their precise geogra-
phies, however, vary according to the contexts in which traders from different back-
grounds live and work. As explored elsewhere and in this special issue, such geogra-
phies are powerfully influenced by historic and ongoing geopolitical processes played 
out across Eurasia (Anderson 2018; Anderson this issue; Marsden and Skrivskja 2018). 
The Afghans based in Yiwu export commodities to several world regions and are influ-
enced by and respond to multiple geopolitical dynamics (Marsden 2017). The focus of 
this article, however, is on trading networks made up of Afghans operating across 
Eurasia, specifically in the markets of the former Soviet Union (Marsden 2016a).  
The ethnographic material presented in this article demonstrates that it is important 
to resist the temptation of classifying Afghan merchants who travel to Yiwu and 
beyond as one-dimensional ‘elites’ who inhabit a world apart from those of the 
country’s refugees. The movement of people, things and capital, rather, are mutually 
entangled: refugees can be an important force behind economic development (Carrier 
2017). Based on eight months of fieldwork conducted with Afghan traders in Yiwu, as 
well as extensive research conducted over a decade with traders from Afghanistan who 
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deal in commodities procured in China, I seek to contribute in two broad ways to 
understanding the entangled nature of such global networks. 
First, I am concerned by the ways in which commercial actors play a central role 
in shaping, directing, and channelling refugee mobility: merchants, I suggest, play a 
critical role in the circulation not only of commercial personnel and labourers, but also 
of refugees and asylum seekers. Second, in this article I seek to nuance our understand-
ings of the economic geographies associated with such entangled forms of mobility. 
Far from being a context from which Afghans merely ‘migrate’, Afghanistan is critical 
to the interconnected geographical trajectories of both merchants and migrants. A con-
sideration of the entangled trajectories of commercial actors and refugees reveals limit-
ations to the analytical value of conventional economic geographies that depict settings 
such as Afghanistan as peripheral to the global economy. Afghanistan, rather, plays a 
central role in inter-Asian circulations of goods and people  
At one level, I build on an expanding body of interdisciplinary work that has sought 
to illuminate the importance of circulatory mobility to inter-regional relationships (Ho 
2017; Markovits et al. 2006). At another, as I address in detail below, a key aspect of 
scholarly work on trading networks pertains to the forms of trust on which geographic-
ally dispersed social formations are dependent. This body of work contains analyses 
of the role that kinship, ethnicity and religion play in forging bonds of trust in long-
distance trade networks (Carrier 2017; Falzon 2004). The scholarship on such net-
works has contributed to the development of over-arching theories on the importance 
of trusts to economic activity (Gambetta 2000; Greif 2006). Other scholars have 
emphasized that the ways in which such actors work in a general climate of ‘mistrust’ 
requires closer scholarly attention (Carey 2017; Humphrey 2018). In this article, I 
enrich these positions by exploring the specific practices that are deployed by actors 
who make up trading networks and who pragmatically entrust commodities, persons, 
and capital to one another. The outcomes of such ‘practices of entrustment’ (Shipton 
2007) are not necessarily, however, enduring bonds or ties of trust. Such outcomes are 
more helpfully understood as reflecting, rather, the roles and activities of individuals 
and networks at specific temporal junctures. In this sense, the role that practices of 
entrustment play in forging the social relationships on which trading networks are 
based are contingent on multiple factors (Mathew 2019): a change in a person’s role 
or activity in a network also leads to transformations in their relationships with others. 
Such contingency is recognized and reflected upon by the traders who often remarked 
to me during the course of my fieldwork that, ‘there can never be such a thing as one 
hundred percent trust or reliability – we are humans and therefore we can always 
change our mind.’ The ways in which the traders handle and manage underlying con-
tingency adds a further layer in understanding the durability of commercial networks. 
Afghan trading networks: multi-nodal and poly-stranded 
Afghans have been active in the sale of Chinese-made commodities across many 
different contexts of the former Soviet Union for much of the last four decades 
(Marsden 2015). In the past two decades, traders once active in the former Soviet 
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Union have extended their activities to markets in western Europe (Marsden 2016b). 
The individuals involved in the trade in low-grade Chinese commodities are almost 
entirely men, though many live with their families in the countries in which they are 
based. They identify with a multiplicity of ethno-linguistic and regional backgrounds; 
indeed, the capillary-like networks through which they work are frequently (if not 
exclusively) based on sub-national identity markers. At significant nodes, such as 
Yiwu, however, networks based on familial, regional and ethno-linguistic, and less 
frequently religious identity, intersect with one another. In the context of such inter-
actions, the identity marker ‘Afghan’ (Hanifi 2013) is also activated in the traders’ 
collective self-identities (Marsden 2016b). The traders do not generally refer to their 
commercial activities and distribution in space as trading networks, although the Farsi 
term shabaqa-e tijorati is widely used in the country’s media and by policy makers. 
Instead, traders often say ‘we Afghans are globally dispersed’ (dar duniya teet 
shudim). They frequently emphasize the extent to which Afghans live and work in 
unexpected settings. During a meeting in Kabul, for example, one trader in his late 
thirties told me that he even knew of traders from Afghanistan based in Columbia and 
Venezuela. If the concept of network is not widely used by the traders to describe their 
global dispersal, they at least consciously recognize the importance of this to their 
collective commercial activities. A Yiwu-based trader in his late twenties who had 
recently returned from a business trip to Moscow told a gathering of his compatriots 
based in Yiwu that Afghans living in Ukraine and Russia were among the most 
successful ‘trading groups’ (gruh-e tijorati) in the former Soviet settings. Indeed, the 
degree to which traders associate their geographic dispersal with success in trade was 
emphasized by a trader based in the Ukrainian city of Odessa: ‘Odessa used to be a 
Jewish city’, he remarked to me, ‘if you think about it, we have taken their place – 
Afghans are dispersed all over the world, and wherever they live, they are busy in 
trade.’  
Historians working on long-distance trade have identified two especially signifi-
cant types of trading network, namely monocentric and polycentric. In his study of the 
Armenian merchant community of New Julfa, Aslanian argues that Armenians consti-
tuted a ‘multinodal monocentric network’. Multiple nodes were critical to the activities 
of New Julfa’s Armenians, yet both the objects and credit necessary for commerce and 
the women and priests central to the network’s social and cultural reproduction had 
their origins in New Julfa. In this sense, New Julfa formed a single dominant ‘nodal 
center’, which ‘defines and regulates the identity and economic vitality of the network 
as a whole’ (Aslanian 2014: 15). By contrast, ‘multinodal polycentric’ trading net-
works are characterized by having had no single ‘nodal center that dominated most 
aspects of … the lives of merchants and members of the same community’ (Aslanian 
2014: 15; cf. Trivellato 2009). Multinodal polycentric networks, however, operated 
from numerous centres, each of which was important for the activities of the trading 
network as whole (Trivellato 2009). 
Differences in the structure of historic trading networks had significant implica-
tions for the types of commercial ventures upon which the traders embarked. 
Mononodal networks privileged partnerships with individuals internal to their 
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network. Traders active across polycentric networks regularly developed relationships 
with individuals external to the network they formed; doing so was essential to the 
expansion of networks into new contexts (Markovits 2000; cf. Anderson this issue). 
Afghanistan’s long-distance merchants in Eurasia organize their commercial 
activities in relation to multiple trading nodes. A handful of such nodes are of special 
significance to the collective activities of Afghans across the expansive Eurasian arena 
(including, for example, Yiwu, Moscow and Odessa). None of these nodes, however, 
assumes a position of overwhelming importance over any others in the network. 
Furthermore, while kin- and ethnicity-based contacts help to shape the commercial 
relationships of Afghan traders, traders also collectively value the capacity to develop 
ties to persons external to their networks (Marsden and Ibañez-Tirado 2015). 
Historical work also suggests that whether a network is multinodal or mononodal 
has implications for its ability to withstand transformation in the contexts across which 
it operates. Aslanian focuses on the decline of Armenian trading networks in the wake 
of the calamity that beset its central node of New Julfa after the invasion of the city by 
Nadir Shah in the mid-eighteenth century. His work also illustrates that a network’s 
durability is not merely determined by its mononodal or multimodal structure. Durabil-
ity is also conferred by a network’s ability to switch between and connect the fields of 
economic and political agency. The collective trading activities of New Julfa’s 
Armenians suffered irrevocably in the wake of the decline of their central node, yet 
merchants subsequently played a major role in creating new forms of political identity 
and institutions by reinventing themselves as members of an Armenian nation and 
calling for the establishment of a nation-state (Aslanian 2014: 214). 
The interactions of Afghan traders with politics and the state have, in a comparable 
though distinct way, differed from those of New Julfa’s Armenians. Afghan traders 
currently active in the former Soviet Union mostly embarked on their careers as officials 
in the pro-Soviet Kabul-based government. They formed a political grouping that lost 
authority in 1992 over what had been its nodal centre, Kabul, as well as of Afghanistan’s 
state institutions more generally. In the wake of these losses, relationships cultivated 
in the field of politics re-emerged in the form of an economic network. The individuals 
making up the network were familiar with formerly Soviet Eurasia, for they had been 
educated and undergone training in the Soviet Union (Ibañez-Tirado 2019). After 
1992, thousands of mid-ranking government officials and army officers moved from 
Afghanistan to the cities in which they had studied in the former Soviet Union, includ-
ing Moscow, St Petersburg, Kharkov, Dushanbe, Odessa, and Minsk. These cities had 
played an affective and ideological role in the life trajectories of Afghans. In addition, 
many married local women whom they had met during their years as students and 
officials. Having returned, they rapidly began to earn a living and to generate capital 
through trading in the informal markets and bazaars. These had surfaced across former 
Soviet space in the context of the collapse of the command economy (Humphrey 2002) 
and a range of diasporic organizations, including those run by Afghans, played a 
critical role in establishing these institutions (cf. Marouda this issue). 
A significant proportion of the first wave of Afghan officials who started to trade 
in cities such as Moscow and Kiev, eventually left the former Soviet Union: some 
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sought asylum in Western countries and a smaller proportion returned to Afghanistan 
to take up positions in the government established after the military defeat of the 
Taliban in 2001/2. Afghan trading networks in the former Soviet Union were able to 
recruit from a substantial pool of labour and commercial acumen, which granted them 
the chance of ‘diversification, expansion and longevity’ (Aslanian 2014: 224). Con-
tacts between Afghan traders and officials in the post-Soviet countries in which they 
traded made this movement of commercial personnel possible: Afghan officials-cum-
merchants developed routes used by Afghans to travel formally and informally to 
formerly Soviet countries.  
Most Afghans moving into post-Soviet space from the late 1990s onwards arrived 
there either as students in the region’s universities (often supported by government 
bursaries) or as migrants (both legal and illegal) who then applied for refugee status 
after having entered the country to which they were travelling. In the countries of the 
former Soviet Union, seeking permanent leave-to-remain documents by means of an 
asylum claim is widely regarded by Afghans as also allowing a person to establish a 
small business. Students (maasilin) and refugees (muhajir) provided a supply of labour 
for established traders. Informal migratory routes provided the low-cost labour upon 
which commercial networks depend: ‘new arrivals’ were employed as labourers 
(juwaligar), drivers, and retail sellers (furishonda). Simultaneously, wealthier 
migrants established business partnerships with settled Afghan merchants and brought 
capital from Afghanistan to such relationships. 
The movement of commercially able personnel from Afghanistan to former Soviet 
countries helped the networks extend into Western Europe. Established merchants 
were able to leave the Soviet Union for Western Europe by entrusting the activities of 
their businesses to new arrivals. Having done so, they embarked on the time-consum-
ing course of opening businesses in the European countries in which they sought 
asylum. As a result, nodes within Eurasian networks were injected with economic and 
geographic vitality as established merchants moved between post-Soviet Eurasia and 
Western Europe.  
Yiwu: a dominant node in a multi-modal network 
If one node in Eurasia’s Afghan networks has a relatively greater significance than 
others it is Yiwu.2 A significant proportion of the approximately 100,000 Afghan 
traders working across the former Soviet Union either directly purchase the products 
in which they deal in Yiwu or procure them from either Afghan or other merchants. 
Yiwu earned a reputation within China in the 1980s for being a trading centre where 
the authorities ignored forms of trade that were penalized elsewhere in the country on 
the grounds being illegal. In the early 1990s, the city began to attract a small number 
of international traders (mostly from Afghanistan and Pakistan): in the context of this 
development, its municipal authorities adopted policies that were specifically designed 
to attract ‘foreign merchants’. Such policies eventually came to include the provision 
of a two-year business visa/work permit and a simplified taxation system (Rui 2018). 
Hawala currency dealers have also reported to me that they were able to transfer cash 
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from Afghanistan to Yiwu with ease. Such capital – often identified by the merchants 
themselves as ‘black money’ (pul-e siyah) – played a major role in allowing Afghan 
trading offices based in Yiwu to provide goods on credit to Afghan customers, 
including visitors to Yiwu from Eurasian cities. By the late 2000s, the city had become 
a major centre for the global trade in ‘small commodities’ and a hub for business com-
munities from the Muslim-majority countries of South and West Asia, as well as 
Africa.3 From 2016 onwards, however, the changing nature of China’s economy began 
to raise questions about Yiwu’s status as a global trading node. In particular, the stricter 
regulation of currency flows, a growing emphasis on e-commerce rather than 
traditional trade, as well as the rising costs of daily life, business expenses and labour, 
have resulted in fewer traders basing themselves in the city. Indeed, some traders 
(including those of Afghan background) have moved both their businesses and their 
families out of the city, mostly to Istanbul.4 
Discussions among groups of traders in Yiwu often revolve around how far the 
city has become a dominant infrastructural node for their collective commercial 
activities. Yet, these traders also recognize that Yiwu’s influence is limited in terms 
of its capacity to facilitate the cultural and sociological reproduction of Afghan net-
works. On the one hand, Afghans based in Yiwu often reflect on Yiwu’s importance 
to their commercial activities. In fact, ever since my first visit to the city in 2013, I 
have increasingly frequently been hearing about their attempts to offset the risks 
entailed by their network’s gradual transition to a monocentric network. Steps taken 
include establishing trading offices in other Chinese cities (notably Beijing, 
Guangzhou and Hong Kong), and purchasing products in countries other than China 
(especially in Vietnam, India, Malaysia and Indonesia). Yet, most remark that no cities 
are able to compete with Yiwu in terms of its well-developed and efficient trading 
infrastructure.  
On the other hand, Afghan and other foreign traders based in Yiwu are themselves 
aware of the extent to which policy in China renders Yiwu an inherently transitory site 
for them. Over the past three decades, the city has become an infrastructural node for 
Afghan trading networks as a result of policies adopted by the city’s authorities in the 
context of China joining the World Trade Organization. Yet, development policy in 
China denies it the forms of social and cultural significance enjoyed by other nodes in 
Afghan networks, such as Moscow and Odessa – both of which act as affective and 
commercial centres for Afghans. Chinese law prevents the traders from securing 
citizenship or access to long-term residency documents: traders with substantial busi-
ness interests must both reapply for their visas and residency documents every two 
years and undergo taxation audits and medical checks; those in more tenuous circum-
stances must often do so biannually. Traders of 60 or more years report difficulties in 
securing Chinese business visas and residency permits. They also report that organiz-
ing the type of cultural events, such as musical performances involving well-known 
Afghan artists, which are a critical aspect of the cultural life of Afghan trading com-
munities elsewhere in Eurasia, is not a type of activity supported by Yiwu’s municipal 
authorities. Furthermore, as Sha (in this issue) shows, a major issue facing traders 
living with their families in Yiwu is the legal and financial implications of sending 
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their children to school: legal restrictions largely prevent the admission of foreign 
children to Chinese government schools.  
Furthermore, Yiwu’s situation in relation to broader political, economic and 
technological processes enhances its status as a node for trade infrastructure but not 
for social and cultural reproduction. Policy-makers in Yiwu are increasingly favouring 
internet commerce over ‘traditional’ forms of trade that rely on resident foreign 
brokers occupying a central role in their city’s future development. Yiwu’s authorities 
also promote policies that are intended to result in Yiwu’s ‘upgrading’, meaning that 
it will be able to conform to a higher margin ‘created in China’ development model 
advocated in Beijing (Marsden and Skvirskaja 2018; Rui 2018). 
Because they recognize that Yiwu is an influential centre in terms of trading infra-
structure but not in relation to social and cultural reproduction, Afghan traders there 
are rarely if ever complacent about its permanence as a node in their networks. Indeed, 
relatively few traders from Afghanistan living in Yiwu have invested their capital in 
homes, property, or industrial ventures such as joint ownership of factories. One trader 
in his late twenties who runs a trading company that ships goods from Yiwu to Dubai, 
Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan and Belarus told me that ‘Afghan traders have much experi-
ence of investing in a country only to see legislation change or for them to be 
indiscriminately deported – that’s why they’re not going to make the mistake again 
and start investing in major business here.’ Prior to moving to Yiwu, this trader had 
worked for three years in a trading office in Sharjah, a commercial centre to several 
hundred traders from Afghanistan, most of whom import cars and vehicle spare parts 
to the UAE from Japan, China and South Korea and re-export these globally. In 2015, 
the UAE revoked the visas of approximately 100 traders from the community.5 
The handful of Afghan traders who have bought property in Yiwu have done so in 
the context of being married to Chinese women.6 Afghans who have invested in the 
city (especially in restaurants, cafes, hotels and gyms) are said by their compatriots to 
have done so only because they have reliable contacts in the local government. Such 
contacts are said to be able to offer reliable advice about changing municipal policy 
relating to foreigners in general and Afghans in particular. In addition to being sites of 
commercial and cultural exchange (Ibañez-Tirado 2018), restaurants also signify the 
close ties of their owners to the local authorities, thereby acting as an important 
indicator of a trader’s ability to conduct business and play a wider mediating role 
between traders and the state.  
Against the backdrop of living in an inherently transitory node, settled Afghan 
traders in China aspire to send their children abroad for education, especially to 
countries where they believe they might secure a document either for residency or 
citizenship. The countries that Afghans most widely visited during the period of my 
research were Russia, India, Ukraine, and Turkey. A substantial cross-section of the 
200 or so Afghan traders with whom I regularly interacted in Yiwu had either travelled 
to these countries with a view to admitting their children to schools or to securing 
residency documents for themselves and their family members.  
Afghan traders are well positioned to adapt to an abrupt shift in Yiwu’s capacity to 
continue to serve as a significant node for their commercial networks. Yiwu’s Afghans 
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have fashioned wide-ranging trading activities over the past two decades; they have 
built multifarious channels of communication with Yiwu’s authorities, and their com-
mercial activities span myriads of geographically dispersed networks made up of 
family members and business associates.  
Contingency, entrustment and economic geography: tied-up cash, Chinese-made 
scooters, and the Kabul property market 
If historians have sought to analyse trading networks in terms of their structure and 
internal dynamics, sociological work on diasporas often focuses on the nature of their 
collective activities. Scholars have drawn contrasts between diasporas as ‘settler’ 
versus ‘mobile’, ‘labour’ versus ‘entrepreneurial’ (Esman 2009), and ‘traditional’ 
versus ‘modernizing elite’ (Safran 1999). Ethnography relating to the life histories of 
individual Afghans active in China and Eurasia suggests the importance of activities 
that cut-across such typologies to the durability of the networks. Having documented 
how Afghan traders in the former Soviet Union switched their collective activities 
from politics to trade, I now explore the contingent ways in which individuals move 
across various statuses (for example, of trader, labourer and refugee) during their lives. 
Doing so reveals the importance of practices of entrustment (rather than abstract forms 
of trust) and of alternative economic geographies to their commercial networks. These 
interconnecting themes are addressed through a consideration of the relationship 
between a trader based in Odessa (Dil Agha), and a man (Yama) who is currently a 
‘refugee’ in Europe but who had previously worked as a trader in Eurasia for two 
decades.  
Yama (whom I first met in Tajikistan in 2009) is from a province in southern 
Afghanistan. He left Afghanistan as a teenager in the early 1990s after the collapse of 
the pro-Soviet government in Kabul. Today he is in his early forties and living in the 
Netherlands. Between 1992 and 1998, Yama lived with his brothers in Pakistan. In 
1999, the family moved to Uzbekistan, where they lived and worked until 2009. Bet-
ween 2009 and 2015, Yama was based – along with his elder brother – in Tajikistan. 
In all the settings in which he has lived since 1992, Yama and his family have made a 
living through trade: they owned a music store in Pakistan and dealt in products 
sourced in Pakistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.  
Yama had become increasingly exasperated by the conditions of life in Tajikistan 
when I spent time with him in 2013 in Dushanbe, Tajikistan’s capital. During our 
previous interactions between 2009 and 2013, he had talked with me freely about his 
trading activities (especially the wholesale trade in Pakistani tangerines and Iranian 
citrus fruits). Yet, in 2012, Yama complained that the country’s authorities were mak-
ing life ever more difficult for Afghan trader-refugees such as himself.7 Official 
legislation forbade Afghans registered as refugees in Tajikistan from residing in 
Dushanbe; those who did, he told me, were made to pay frequent bribes (pora; rishwat) 
by the city’s police force. Furthermore, new legislation meant that Afghans living in 
Dushanbe were required to pay a substantial sum of money each year to extend their 
official refugee permits. In addition, Afghanistan received repeated visits from 
Magnus Marsden 
10  
Dushanbe’s intelligence services requesting ‘road money’ (rah puli) to cover the cost 
of the officials’ travel to and from work and ‘guest money’ (mehmon puli) to allow the 
officers to treat their guests according to local standards of hospitality. In addition, the 
weakening Tajik currency (Somoni), alongside the tightening by the country’s authori-
ties from 2015 onwards of the activities of unofficial currency dealers (saraaf; 
hawaladar), also restricted the business activities of Afghans in the country. Traders 
from Afghanistan are accustomed to being treated as revenue sources by the authorities 
of Central Asian states (cf. Marsden 2012, 2016b). Against the backdrop of a 
worsening Tajik economy, however, additional and repeated payments made life for 
Afghan traders and refugees in the country such as Yama unsustainable.  
From trader to sojourner: Central Asia’s steppes to the Black Sea 
In 2015, Yama travelled from Tajikistan to Ukraine, where he spent six months in the 
Black Sea port city of Odessa. During that period, he stayed in multiple apartments – 
one of which was made available to him by an Afghan ‘smuggler’ (qochoqbar) to 
whom he had paid $3000 to arrange a Ukraine entry visa. After having been burgled, 
Yama decided to rent a flat of his own. Yama assumed that the smuggler had told the 
burglar that Yama was carrying a substantial amount of cash. Yama was accompanied 
to Ukraine by his two young children and needed to arrange for them to go to a school 
in Odessa: he was determined that they would not fall behind in their education as he 
had in Afghanistan and Pakistan in the 1990s.  
During his six-month stay in Odessa, Yama would make intermittent visits to the 
Seven-Kilometre market, an enormous wholesale market located on the city’s periph-
ery. Most of the approximately 4000 Afghans based in Odessa either run wholesale 
businesses in the market (purveying commodities they import to Ukraine from China) 
or are employed in it by their compatriots (as sellers, labourers and warehouse 
keepers).8 
Afghan asylum seekers in Odessa tend to invest the cash with which they travel to 
Ukraine in a shop in the Seven-Kilometre market. Yama decided not to invest any of 
the capital (sarmaiya) he had brought with him from Tajikistan in a commercial oper-
ation in the market. Yama had carried on his person some of the cash that he had 
brought to Ukraine from Tajikistan. He had transferred more using the services of a 
Dushanbe-based money exchange agent (saraafi) from northern Afghanistan. Yama 
explained to me that he did not set up a shop dealing in Chinese goods in the market 
because his priority was to travel – along with his two young children – to Western 
Europe. If he invested some of the approximately $100,000 at his disposal in a com-
mercial operation in Odessa, he told me, his money would have become ‘stuck’ (band 
maand) and his ability to move constrained. Yama’s transition from a trader (taajir) to 
an officially designated refugee (muhajir) involved resisting the temptation to invest 
capital in a commercial operation.  
Yama had also arrived in Ukraine with considerably less capital at his disposal than 
he had initially hoped. He had entrusted (amaanat kardan) a sizeable proportion of the 
money he had saved in Tajikistan to a Tajikistani trader called Shahid. The two had 
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known one another for nearly twenty years since their initial meeting in Uzbekistan. 
Shahid had fled from Tajikistan during of the country’s bloody civil war (1992–97) 
and the two had established a trading partnership (sharokat); they also worked together 
in Dushanbe after Shahid returned to Tajikistan from Uzbekistan when conditions 
improved in the early 2000s.  
In Dushanbe, the men spent much time together and their business activities 
(marmaalah) became increasingly intertwined. Yama sent Shahid to the Khujand with 
consignments of tangerines to sell, and Shahid was a regular guest in Yama’s flat in 
Dushanbe. In addition, since Yama was a registered refugee in Tajikistan, he was 
unable to travel outside the country, so he entrusted his capital to Shahid, as a 
Tajikistan citizen could travel visa-free to Iran to source products (especially citrus 
fruit) in Mashhad.  
Despite the length of their relationship and the clear ties of friendship (dusti; 
rafoqat), shared experiences (taajrubah) and commensality that bound them, Shahid 
failed to answer Yama’s telephone calls from the day he left Tajikistan. As a result, 
Yama could not retrieve the savings that he had entrusted to him.  
Yama faced a similar dilemma with one of his Afghan relatives, his brother’s 
brother-in-law (Aziz). When he was in his mid-thirties, Aziz was based in Kabul where 
he and his brothers ran a medium-sized business selling construction materials. He had 
also traded in tangerines with Yama in Tajikistan. Aziz’s business in Kabul had 
decreased in size as a result of the withdrawal of significant numbers of NATO forces 
in 2014 and a decline in new infrastructure projects in the country. Against this back-
drop, he and his brothers had borrowed money from relatives and friends, including 
Yama, to keep their business afloat. As with Shahid, Yama told me that Aziz had also 
failed to return his phone calls in the days leading up to his departure for Ukraine.  
Yama’s difficulty recovering debts from his transnational network of business 
associates, friends, and kin, emphasizes the importance of both recognizing underlying 
mistrust and of building trust to our understanding of the dynamics of long-distance 
trading networks. Alessandro Monsutti notes that for many Afghans ‘relatives are not 
so much people one can trust as people one knows; this makes it possible to take ven-
geance in case of defection, either by locating them and resorting to physical violence, 
or by ruining their reputation in a shared social milieu’ (Monsutti 2013: 152). Yama’s 
attempts to gather debts (qarz jam kuni) from his close relatives and friends reveals the 
extent to which the threat of physical or reputational vengeance loses its power in 
contexts characterized by flux, mobility and uncertainty.  
Trusted friends or unexpected partners? 
Understanding the calculations that individuals like Yama make about to whom to 
entrust their capital, in terms of calculated evaluations of long-term relationships of 
friendship and kinship alone, deflects attention from the contingent ways in which the 
circulation of people and things takes place across expansive spaces such as the 
Eurasian arena. In Odessa, for example, Yama chose to entrust (amaanat kardan) his 
money to Dil Agha, a man with whom he had neither worked nor enjoyed close (qarib) 
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ties of friendship or kinship. Associates (ashnaaha) whom Yama had come to know 
in Odessa had told him that Dil Agha was reliable and trustworthy. Yama sought to 
verify these assessments and told me how he ‘spent time with him on three or four 
occasions and it appeared he was good’. Far from handing over his cash for safe-
keeping to a person known to him over a prolonged period or to a close relative, Yama 
entrusted the cash to Dil Agha after only a brief acquaintance. His ability to do so was 
enhanced by the existence of an institution – in this case the market – that served as a 
pool of reliable information about commerce and about the personal reputations of 
Afghan traders (see Anderson this issue). 
Given the impromptu nature of Yama’s ties to Dil Agha, it is relevant to consider 
in detail the relationship between the two men. Dil Agha was formerly a mid-ranking 
state official in the Soviet-aligned government of Afghanistan. After the collapse of 
the regime in 1992, Dil Agha initially moved to a Soviet successor state in the 
Caucasus, where he worked for a company that sourced hazel nuts for export to 
Ukraine. In the Caucasus, he married a local woman before the couple moved to 
Ukraine with their newly born child. In Ukraine, Dil Agha initially sold goods that he 
took on a credit basis (qarz) from an Afghan trader.9 After four years, Dil Agha earned 
enough credit working in this manner to rent his own shop; eventually, he began to 
import goods from Yiwu by himself. His prudence and credit worthiness were reflec-
ted both in the capital he had earned over the years and in his reputation in the bazaar 
as a trustworthy person.  
As the years passed, Dil Agha made enough profit to buy the shops (shipping 
containers) in which he sold his goods; he was later also able to purchase warehouse 
space (gudaam; anbaar) in a building close to the market. He then bought shops next 
to his own to prevent his competitors doing so and weakening his business. By 2015, 
Dil Agha was comfortable in terms of the living standards of Afghan traders in Odessa 
but by no means regarded by the community as ‘rich’ (puldaar). In addition to three 
containers and a warehouse, Dil Agha also owned a renovated Soviet-era flat, as well 
as a smaller two-bedroom apartment in a newly built residential complex. Despite 
being able to accumulate successfully and to invest capital in Odessa over a period of 
20 years, the decline in the value of Ukraine’s currency that occurred in the wake of 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, alongside increasingly cut-throat levels of 
competition between traders from Afghanistan in the market, meant that Dil Agha was 
always seeking to cut his daily costs.  
A consideration of the sources of competition that Dil Agha regarded in 2016 as 
making the scooter trade in Odessa especially fierce, reveals further conceptual issues 
that arise when trust is regarded as the fundamental tissue that binds trading networks 
together. According to Dil Agha, an Afghan who had been based in Canada for many 
years and had moved with his family to Ukraine in the mid-2000s, this incomer had 
started a business selling children’s bicycles. His business was substantial: the trader 
imported scooters from China bearing the logo of his own company, which meant that 
he had entered into a contract (qaradaad) with a supplier to buy a specified number of 
products each year. Indeed, this trader also exported the branded scooters from China 
to Russia, where he owned warehouses and shops in markets in St Petersburg and 
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Moscow. Furthermore, the trader’s brother had recently emigrated to Odessa from 
London, bringing with him savings generated from working in the city first as a waiter 
and then as a taxi driver: these savings were also invested in the brother’s scooter 
business. For Dil Agha, the two brothers were attempting to dominate and control the 
Odessa’s market in scooters. Yet, trying to do this by using money transferred from 
London and Canada gave them an unfair advantage over the Afghan traders who had 
spent years building up their businesses in the Seventh-Kilometre Market.  
Rivals from beyond what Dil Agha and others regarded as being the moral com-
munity of Odessa’s established Afghan traders, meant that cut-throat competition was 
not confined to the market. As with the case of Yama, Dil Agha told me that his 
business had suffered on several occasions from the skulduggery of his own Afghan 
friends. Dil Agha is part of a circle of friends who all identify themselves as being 
from northern Afghanistan; the men making up the friendship background are roughly 
of the same age and political background. The friends socialize in all-male group 
gatherings, as well as together with their families; indeed, they have exchanged daugh-
ters and sons in marriage with one another and their wider kinship networks as well. 
The four men refer to their friendship circle as constituting a kollektif. One of the 
friends in the kollektif is Haji Karim, a trader from an ethnically Uzbek family in 
northern Afghanistan, who had studied in a military institute in Ukraine in the early 
1980s and served in the Afghan Army until the collapse of the regime in 1992. Dil 
Agha told me how, two years previously, Haji Karim had imported a large quantity of 
scooters from Yiwu; at the same time, he had arranged a shipment of the same items 
for Dil Agha. Having apparently assisted Dil Agha in bringing a larger number of 
scooters to Ukraine than he would have been otherwise able, Haji Karim went on to 
sell his proportion of the goods at such a low profit margin that Dil Agha was unable 
to sell the goods at the rate he needed to make a reasonable return. At the end of the 
season, Dil Agha ended up with many more scooters in his warehouse than anticipated. 
After this experience, Dil Agha told me that he stayed clear of Afghans in Yiwu, 
preferring to pay Chinese companies to arrange the export of his goods to Ukraine. 
‘Gift by the donkey load; account in ounces!’: calculation, trust and serendipity 
In the context of such competition, Dil Agha had bought a consignment of scooters 
from Yiwu using the cash (approximately $20,000) that Yama had entrusted to him; 
he was sure the scooters would sell well: they were a new design hitherto unavailable 
in the market. The purchase and arrival of the scooters was also perfectly timed: they 
would arrive in early spring, a time of year punctuated by a series of public holidays 
in Ukraine, when parents buy scooters as presents for their children.  
A couple of months after having entrusted the money to Dil Agha, however, Yama 
approached him to say that he had found a smuggler (qaachaaqbaar) who had agreed 
to take him and his two children to Europe. Dil Agha told Yama that he should not 
rush to leave Ukraine: it would be wise to wait for a more reliable smuggler who was 
better known to them before embarking on the dangerous route to ‘Europe’ with his 
children. Yama told Dil Agha, however, that he had made up his mind: he asked Dil 
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Agha to return the cash (paisa nurkh) he had entrusted to him, so that he could pay the 
deposit (puli peshaki) required by the smuggler. Dil Agha told Yama that he would 
need a few days to get Yama his cash as he had invested it in his business. I asked 
Yama if he had not been worried that Dil Agha would fail to return the money: he 
replied, citing the Persian proverb, ‘bakhshish ba kharwar, hisob ba musqol’ (‘gift by 
the donkey load and account in ounces’). In other words, Dil Agha had demonstrated 
that he was reliable in that he was an ‘exact’ (daqiq) person, with a close focus on his 
accounting practices, rather than on achieving a name through lavish gift giving. 
Entrusting property, returning capital: Kabul’s property market 
Having been requested by Yama to return the money he had been entrusted as soon as 
possible, Dil Aga deployed a financial instrument widely used in Afghanistan by 
property owners to secure access to cash – a giraw. The giraw practice is widely 
conducted in Afghanistan and other countries in which the dominant legal code is based 
on the Hanafi School (maslak) of Islamic law; in Afghanistan, it is a recognized legal 
practice within the part of the country’s Ottoman-inspired legal code that relates to 
mortgages (raan).10 Giraw entails a property owner handing his or her property to 
another party for an agreed sum of cash. Upon the return of the cash, the original owner 
of the property reassumes full ownership. While giraw is widely practised in 
Afghanistan, it is the source of theological dispute, both in the country and in the wider 
Muslim world. For Muslims following legal traditions other than the Hanafi School, the 
practice of giraw (mostly referred to in Arabic as a bay’ al wafa or ‘purchase on 
honour’) is regarded as constituting an agreement between a seller and buyer to resell a 
property at the original purchasing price. Since the person giving the loan can use the 
property to make money, scholars from other legal traditions regard giraw as a practice 
that allows individuals to contravene shari’a stipulations regarding interest (riba).  
Afghan traders often point out that traders rarely make regular and rigorous assess-
ments about how far their daily practices relate to Islamic prescriptions. A trader in his 
early forties who owns a clothing factory in China and wholesale business in Kabul 
told me that Islam’s role in Afghan traders’ business activities should not be over-
exaggerated, remarking, ‘there is much of what we do that Islam tells us not to and it 
is the same with giraw’. Other traders, however, do follow theological debates about 
giraw. They generally argue that if the party providing the cash uses the property to 
house his family, then the giraw is lawful (halal). Should the property, however, be 
rented out by the buyer to a third party, then this constitutes a mode of making interest 
(sud) on a loan (qarz) and is therefore impermissible (haram) according to Islamic law.  
A consideration of the use of giraw in the case of Dil Agha tells us less about the 
role that Islam does or does not play in commerce than it does about the importance of 
specific practices of entrustment to Afghan trading networks; it is also a demonstration 
of Afghanistan’s non-peripheral position in the Eurasian economic geography under 
consideration here. In return for $20,000, Dil Agha allowed a creditor unrestricted use 
of his flat in Kabul until the loan had been repaid and a date agreed for the return of 
the flat. Dil Agha arranged for the money to be transferred to Odessa from Kabul using 
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a saraaf and was able to return Yama his cash by the date on which it was required. 
Being party to such an agreement contains an important element of risk, especially for 
an individual such as Dil Agha who is not based in the country and does not regularly 
travel there. While having friends, family and associates in Kabul, Dil Agha has no 
access in Afghanistan to the dense social and political networks that individuals per-
manently based in the country do. 
The flat that Dil Agha had put on giraw to raise Yama’s money was of great personal 
significance to him. Dil Agha proudly told me how he had bought it in Kabul before the 
collapse of President Najibullah’s regime in 1992. He first rented the flat in the Soviet-
era microrayon (housing area). Eventually, however, it was allocated to him under a 
government scheme into which he paid a monthly contribution with the prospect of 
eventually owning the property. As with many other government employees, after the 
collapse of President Najibullah’s regime, Dil Agha initially remained in Kabul and 
continued working in his post. During this period, however, the mujahidin leaders who 
had come to power regularly accused former state officials of corruption and often 
occupied the properties they owned. According to Dil Agha, however, his good 
reputation and willingness to work for a time for the Islamic government meant that – 
against all odds – he was able to maintain control of his property. Dil Agha was intent 
on returning the loan and reassuming full ownership of the property as soon as possible.  
Crossing the Carpathians: from sojourner to refugee 
Shortly after Dil Agha received the money from Kabul, Yama left Odessa – on the 
instruction of a smuggler – with his two children for a town close to the Ukraine–
Slovakia border. Having stayed for several weeks in a hotel in the town, the family 
successfully travelled to the Netherlands, by way of Slovakia, Austria and Germany. 
Before embarking on the journey, Yama agreed to take Dil Agha’s brother’s son, 
Karim with him. Now in his early twenties, Karim had been working with Dil Agha in 
his shop in the Seventh-Kilometre Market for the past four years. Uncle (kaaka) and 
nephew (nawaasa), however, did not get on well. Karim was religious (mazhabi) and 
his constant preaching against alcohol and insinuating that his wife dressed inappropri-
ately for a Muslim irritated Dil Agha. In addition, three years of carrying heavy goods 
between the warehouse and shops in the Seventh-Kilometre Market had taken its 
physical toll on Karim: he suffered from serious health problems and Dil Agha advised 
him either to return to Afghanistan for treatment or to travel on to Europe with Yama 
and apply for an asylum case. Yama agreed to pay half of the fee (approximately 
$7000) requested by the people smuggler: he knew that although in poor health, Karim 
would be able to help Yama’s children (aged 10 and 13) to traverse what the people 
smuggler had warned them would be a long and difficult journey across the Carpathian 
Mountains.  
Before travelling to Western Europe Yama entrusted a further tranche of cash to 
Dil Agha. Over the new few months Dil Agha transferred Yama’s amanat to the 
Netherlands in instalments using exchange agents (saraaf) based in Odessa. When I 
met Dil Agha in China in May 2016, he proudly showed me WhatsApp messages 
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informing Yama of how much money had been forwarded to him – demonstrating his 
trustworthiness and commitment to our mutual friend. By the time I met Yama in the 
Netherlands in November 2017, Dil Agha had sent most of the remaining money to 
him. Yama meanwhile was growing accustomed to the new routines of his life as a 
‘refugee’ supported by a national social welfare system but unable to maintain the life 
of an independent trader (Marsden forthcoming).  
Conclusion 
In this article, I have described the situation of Afghan trading networks in a Eurasian 
economic setting and analysed these in relation to models of the structure of such 
networks developed by historians. The Afghan networks were initially built by groups 
who responded to the retraction of the Soviet Union by shifting their collective activi-
ties from the domain of politics to that of the economy; over time, their activities have 
benefited from their ability to connect these two fields. The networks explored are best 
categorized as multimodal: Yiwu is a dominant node viewed from the perspective of 
a commercial infrastructure. Yet, the collective shift of mobile Afghans from political 
to economic functions has added other nodal centres in post-Soviet spaces to the net-
work, which are also ‘centres’ when viewed from the perspective of social and cultural 
reproduction; as such, they contribute to the durability of the network as a whole. I 
have also suggested that commercial networks are more durable when they consist of 
coalescing networks of labourers, creditors and entrepreneurs – including mobile 
populations such as students and refugees – and that they are structured by institutions 
that allow individuals to shift between these statuses and functions. In the article, I 
have sought to make three more specific contributions towards understanding the 
durability of trading networks.  
First, the circulations documented above arise out of multiple kinds of social 
relationships and networks. Such networks are the sites of interactions between traders, 
refugees, labourers and local actors in nodes, such as Yiwu and Odessa, at which the 
networks intersect. Indeed, the ethnographic material presented above points to the 
ways in which, over the course of their lives, individuals experience transformations 
in their statuses and roles in networks. The legal significance of being a ‘refugee’, for 
example, means something different in the Netherlands than in Tajikistan or Ukraine. 
Shifting meanings in the everyday significance of legal categories have critical impli-
cations for Afghan understandings of themselves and of the nature of the economic 
activities in which individuals are involved. A consideration of such entwined 
circulations, and the shifting statuses and roles with which mobility is associated, 
brings to light a multiplicity of commercial, financial and migratory geographies: these 
overlap with one another in the everyday lives of Afghans working in the Eurasian 
arena. 
Second, the material presented in the article raises broader conceptual issues for 
understanding the role played by trading networks in the contemporary world. 
Examining flows of refugees alongside a consideration of the activities of 
Afghanistan’s traders, questions the assumption that Afghanistan is peripheral to 
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globalized circulations of finance and commodities. The country is, rather, a vital 
source of capital for transnational Afghan networks of credit and trust, networks that 
criss-cross an expansive Eurasian arena and that also extend into the advanced 
economies of Western Europe. Recognition of the penetration of Afghan networks into 
multiple contexts brings attention to alternative financial geographies and their centres, 
nodes, and peripheries. Such geographies challenge the simple understanding that mig-
rant sending countries are merely a departure point for refugees. They draw attention 
instead to the role that such networks and nodes play in the processes of development 
(Carrier 2017). The ethnography presented above also demonstrates how they connect 
regions rarely thought about in relation to one another in conventional economic 
geography. 
A third specific contribution of the article has been to debates on the durability of 
trading networks. Trust is an important concept that provides critical insights into the 
key determinants of the effectiveness of trading networks. Yet, by moving beyond the 
abstract conceptualizations of both trust and mistrust, and focusing instead on tangible 
acts of entrustment (ammanat kardan), notably giving cash for safe-keeping and rais-
ing capital on property, this article has brought attention to the contingency inherent 
in the social relationships around which trading networks form. Hitherto, anthropolo-
gists and scholars in related disciplines have sought to understand the significance of 
trust-based relations to trading networks and commerce in terms of the power of shared 
ties of kinship, friendship, religion and regional identity to such social formations. 
They have done so ethnographically by focusing on ethnographic concepts such as 
‘closeness’ and ‘hospitality’, thereby revealing the importance of moral work and 
moral spaces – notably those associated with the provision of hospitality – to forging 
trust. By drawing attention to the contingent, coincidental and unpredictable interplay 
of individual and collective trajectories over extended periods of time and across 
complex geographical and legally diverse realms, the material presented here 
questions the extent to which the broad field of ethics is always the most suitable 
vehicle through which to understand the relationship between trust and commerce.  
Acknowledgements 
The research on which this article is based would have been impossible without funding from 
the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and 
innovation programme 669 132 – TRODITIES, ‘Yiwu Trust, Global Traders and Commodities in 
a Chinese International City’. The author has also received funding from a British Academy 
Small Grant. The article has benefited from insightful comments and criticisms from Paul 
Anderson, David Henig and Diana Ibañez Tirado. 
Notes 
1. I am aware that a few individuals have registered with the China-based offices of the 
UNHCR and are waiting for the organization to arrange their settlement in third countries. 
2. Afghan traders keep a variety of nodes in place across space and time through maintaining 
properties and basing family members; connections to nodes that have gone through periods 
of decline, yet might prove to be valuable sites for future commerce, are thus sustained.  
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03. Compare Mathews’s (2011) study of African communities in Hong Kong with that of 
Mathews et al. (2017) on Guangzhou. 
04. On Afghan trading communities in Turkey, see Marsden (2018). 
05. Other countries that have seen abrupt and large-scale deportations of Afghan traders over 
the past 15 years include Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan; Afghan traders in Tajikistan have 
also been stripped of their assets and seen their businesses closed by the authorities. 
06. Most such women are of Han rather than Muslim Hui or Uyghur background, though some 
converted to Islam after marrying men from Afghanistan. 
07. While Afghan traders visit and work in Tajikistan using official business visas, the majority 
of Afghans permanently based in the country are formally registered as refugees with the 
government and the UNHCR. For more details, see Marsden (2016b).  
08. The Seventh-Kilometre market was established in 1999 against the backdrop of the break-
down of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new market economies (Humphrey and 
Skrvskaja 2009). Traders based in the market hail from a wide range of ethno-linguistic 
backgrounds, including local Russian-speaking Ukrainian nationals, Afghans, Turks, Kurds, 
Azeris, Syrians, and Vietnamese, each of which is active in a particular niche. See Skrvskaja 
(2014) and Marouda (this issue). 
09. Afghanistan’s Hindu and Sikh minority communities were critical actors in the trade in 
commodities between South and Central Asia, as well as Russia (Levi 2002). 
10. For a detailed discussion of the relationship between the Afghan and Ottoman legal systems, 
see Ahmed (2017).  
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